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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY,
a joint venture,
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Plaintiff and Respondent
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vs.
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BOWLING LANES,
Defendant and Appellant,
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BACKGROUND FACTS PERTINENT TO THIS PETITION
1.

Wesley F. Sine entered into a written agreement to

purchase the common stock of Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc.
after his

real

estate agents had

inquired

of Sidney M.

Horman, the lessor of the property, whether Sidney M. Horman
would be willing to renew the lease which by its terms had an
expiration date of September 14, 1981.

(Findings of Fact

Para. No. 8, R 1199)
2.

Sidney M. Horman, on at least two occasions advised

Wesley F. Sine's real estate agents that he would be willing
to renew the lease on reasonable terms but would not sign a
new lease agreement until near or at the expiration of the
lease which was currently in effect.

(Findings of Fact Para.

No. 9, R 1199)
3.

After

the

acquisition

of

the

common

stock

of

Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc., Wesley F. Sine requested that
his real estate agents inquire of S.M. Horman concerning his
intent regarding the renewal or the granting of the new lease
at the expiration of the current lease.

(Findings of Fact

Para. No. 14, R 1200)
4.

S. M. Horman again assured the real estate agents

of Wesley F. Sine that S. M. Horman would renew the lease
agreement

upon

reasonable

terms

and

expiration of the then current lease.

conditions

at

the

(Findings of Fact Para

No. 15, R 1201)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT NO. 1.

The case at hand is distinguishable from

the cases relied upon in the Decision rendered.

In the case

at hand the parties agreed to renew the lease agreement upon
"reasonable terms", whereas the case law relied upon in the
decision

concerned

agreements

"negotiation".
2

to

renew

by

further

POINT NO, 2.

The

Court,

in

the

Decision

rendered,

failed ta recognize that the issue presented was whether a
definite

agreement

enforceable,

as

to

renew upon

opposed

to

the

"reasonable
question

of

terms" was
whether

an

agreement to negotiate was enforceable•
POINT NO. 3,
enforceability

The
of

the

Decision

rendered

agreement

to

regarding

renew

the

the
lease

effectively overruled a long standing body of Utah case law
which is directly on point.

In doing so, the Court relied

upon case law which was not on point.
POINT NO. 4.
attorney's

fees

overruled

The

Decision

appears

to have

rendered
ignore^

and

regarding
effectively

a long standing body of case law which is so

closely related as to constitute persuasive authority, if not
precedent.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE UTAH SUPREME
COURT HAS RELIED UPON CASE LAW WHICH IS
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE FACTS OF THE
CASE AT HAND.
The opinion rendered in the case at hand places great
reliance upon Valcarce v. Bitters. 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P. 2d
427 (1961).

Valcarce is a case involving the validity of a

promissory note, not the enforcement of an option to renew a
3

lease.

In Valcarce the trial Court observed:
"I find that there was some talk
about a side contract * * * but I can't
find out what the terms were * * * I
just can't take the thread provided here
and weave a contract for the parties."

fid, at 428.)
Upon reviewing the observation of the trial court, the
Supreme Court stated:
" . . . Under the circumstances shown to exist
here, where there was simply some nebulous notion
in the air that a contract might be entered into in
the future, the court cannot fabricate the kind of
a contract the parties ought to have made and
enforce it. . .[citation omitted]"
fid, at 428-429.)
In Valcarce the trial court found that there was an
insufficient

amount

of

evidence

agreement was between the parties.

to

determine

what

the

In the case at hand, the

trial court was not only able to determine what the agreement
was between

the parties, but also made several

Findings Of Fact about that agreement.
what the parties agreed upon, but

specific

The question is not

instead whether their

agreement is enforceable.
In Pinaree v. The Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558
P. 2d 1317 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the
common law rule concerning options to renew agreements.

In

its opinion it cited Slayter v. Pasley, 199 Or. 616, 264 P.
4

2d 444 (1953) and quoted from Slayter, as follows:
f,f,

The majority rule, in essence, is
that a provision for the extension or
renewal of a lease must specify the time
the lease is to extend and the rate of
rent to be paid with such a degree of
certainty and definiteness that nothing
is left to future determination. If it
falls short of this requirement, it is
not enforceable . . . "
The Court then explained the minority rule has
two divisions. In the first, the provision is held
enforceable if it clearly establishes a mode for
ascertaining the future rental rate, as by
arbitration, or in the second if there is an
express declaration for a reasonable rental during
the extension period, or other words or phrases
which clearly connote and are legally synonymous
with reasonable rental. Under the second division
of the minority rule, the Court implies a mutual
agreement for a reasonable rental."
fid, at 1321)
Pinaree, quoting from Slayter. accurately restated the
common law regarding options to renew leases.

Pinaree did

not delineate which rule Utah would follow.
Pinaree relied upon Slayter which in turn relied upon
and quoted from Holtz v. Olds, 84 Ore. 567, 164 P. 583, which
correctly recognized the common law which upheld preliminary
agreements provided they established some means to arrive at
the final agreement.

In Holtz. the Court said:

11
.
lf

. . [F]or in the lease there construed
we find
a canon by which the subsequent
negotiations may be controlled." There the canon,
criterion or test for the future rental rate was
5

established as "a reasonable rental under the then
existing conditions."
fid, at 449.)
Pinaree must therefore be recognized as standing for the
proposition that the common law upheld preliminary agreements
which contained canons by which future agreements would be
controlled, i. e. "reasonable".
as

standing

for

the

Pinaree must be recognized

proposition

that

under

either

the

majority rule or the first minority rule, agreements to renew
a lease upon

"reasonable terms" were enforceable in most

instances.
Barker v. Francis. 741 P. 2d 548, 551

(Utah 1987),

appears to make substantial inroads into Valcarce.

In Baker,

the Utah Supreme Court stated that it was not necessary that
the preliminary agreement contain all the particulars of the
agreement.
In Kier v. Condrack, 478 P. 2d 327 (Utah 1970), the Utah
Supreme Court indicated that the rule requiring definiteness
of terms:
". . . is only applicable in the proper
circumstances, where the justice of the case
requires: as a shield to protect a party from an
injustice, and not as a weapon with which to
perpetrate an injustice. . ."
fid, at 330.)

6

POINT NO. 2
THE COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE
THE ISSUE PRESENTED.
It needs to be clearly understood that in Pinqree, the
option agreement of the parties was to
"renew the lease . . . upon the same terms and
conditions of the original lease, except
that
the rental
renegotiated . . .

amount

will

be

Factors of tax increase, costs of
business increases or decreases, business
volume and success, insurance costs and
other reasonable allowances, will be the
basis
for terms of negotiation,
(emphasis added)
fid, at 1320.)
The opinion rendered

in the case at hand,

fails to

recognize that there is a clear distinction demonstrated in
the case law between an agreement to renew a lease upon
reasonable terms, and an agreement to negotiate the amount of
rental.
In the former case there is a standard by which the
terms may be determined
parties

have

merely

objectively,

made

an

in the

agreement

to

latter, the
agree

with

unspecified terms.
The trial court found, as a matter of fact, that S. M.
Horman

had

agreed

to

renew

the
7

lease

agreement

upon

"reasonable terms".

(Findings of Fact Para No. 15, R 1201).

At the time that S. M. Horman made his committment and
agreement to renew upon "reasonable terms" he did not state
that "many factors would have to be weighed and put into the
equation".

Such comments were made months later, during the

trial, and related to the basis upon which he, in his mind
would determine what was "reasonable".
The

"Findings" of the trier of

fact

should

not be

overturned on appeal where they are based upon substantial
evidence.
427.

See Valcarce v. Bittersf 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P. 2d

S. M. Horman1s later comments about the basis for the

renewal were properly not included in the Findings because
they were not communicated to Sine's agents when the promise
to renew the lease was made.
It is clear that Pinaree is distinguishable from the
case at hand for the reasons indicated.

Pinaree represented

an agreement to "negotiate", while to the contrary, the case
at hand represents an agreement to renew upon "reasonable
terms".
The decision rendered by the Court is therefore in error
for its failure to recognize the distinction between the two
factual circumstances.
It also needs to be noted that the Utah Supreme Court
8

has recognized the right to have the future rental determined
by

"negotiation"

where

it

is done

through

a method

of

appointing appraisers and/or by arbitration as specified in
the lease agreement•
POINT NO. 3
THE DECISION RENDERED OVERRULES
LONG STANDING CASE LAW.
Cumminas v. Rvttina,

116 Utah 1, 207 P. 2d 804, 805

(1949), indicated that a lease which contained a clause "with
a five year option", was sufficiently definite to renew the
lease upon the same terms and conditions.
Russell v. Valentine, 14 Utah 2d 26, 376 P. 2d 548
(1962), involved an option to renew a lease agreement for a
"further

period".

The

trial

court

permitted

extrinsic

evidence to determine the meaning of the phrase and the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed the decision.
In Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P. 2d 686
(1968), the Utah Supreme court stated:
"Where, as here, a lease contains a clause
granting the lessee the option to require of the
lessor an extension of the lease period, but
subject to arbitration so far as the rent is
concerned, and where the lessee gives notice of
intention to exercise the right of extension, this
is binding on the lessor insofar as the term of the
lease is concerned. . . . [T]he mere acceptance of
a monthly rental at the old rate would not in and
of itself necessarily constitute a waiver of his
right to negotiate a new rate of rental as the
9

lease provides..."
fid, at 689.)
In Thomas J. Peck & Sons. Inc. v. Lee Rock Products,
Inc. . 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P. 2d 446 (1973), the trial court
held the lease agreement to be invalid, concluded that the
tenant was a tenant under the common law, determined what the
relationship was between the parties and the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed stating:
w

. . . I n the absence of an express agreement
between them, the law necessarily implies that they
will meet their obligations to each other on terms
that are reasonable and fair to both. . . "
fid, at 449.)
In Hoffman v. Sullivan. 599 P. 2d 505 (Utah 1979) , the
Utah Supreme Court reviewed a case involving an option.
Utah Supreme Court stated:
"The trial court's finding that there was
ambiguity in the option provision because there was
"no provision . . . made as to how and when
payments would be made" is unsupportable.
The
option price was fixed, and as to that there was no
dispute. In general, such a provision calls for a
payment of cash at the time of the exercise of the
option; hence, as a matter of law, there was no
ambiguity as to how and when payments would be
made.
Just recently this court sustained a contract
which was more ambiguous than the pertinent
provision in the instant contract.
In Ferris v.
Jennings, Utah, 595 P. 2d 857 (1979) this Court
affirmed the enforceability of a contract in which
the only term fixed was the purchase price.
A
10

The

commision to be paid one of the parties, which was
entirely indefinite and ambiguous, was held to be
no obstacle to enforcement of the contract.
In
language directly pertinent to this case, this
Court there stated:
. . . where there is an agreement to sell
property for a specified amount, the
failure to designate the time of payment
does not make the contract a nullity.
Courts universally read into such
contracts an obligation of payment within
a time "reasonable" in the context of the
transaction and circumstances of the
parties.
What is reasonable is a
question of fact.
See also Christensen v. Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102,
339 P. 2d 101 (1959) ; Pepper v. Tanner. Inc. v.
Kedo. Inc.. 13 Wash.App. 433, 535 P. 2d 857
(1975)."
fid, at 508.)
In Valley Lane Corp. v. Bowen. 592 P. 2d 589 (Utah
1979), the Utah Supreme Court, by implication, recognized the
enforceability of an option to renew a lease agreement where
the rental to be paid will have to be determined in the
future by a method involving independent appraisers.
In Ferris v. Jennings. 595 P. 2d 857 (Utah 1979) , the
Utah Supreme Court recognized the general rule that
"a contract will not be specifically enforced
unless the obligations of the parties are "set
forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be
performed."
fid, at 859)

But, the Court went on to state:

"...

But to be considered therewith is the
11

further proposition that the parties to a contract
are obliged to proceed in good faith to cooperate
in performing the contract in accordance with its
expressed intent.
A contract is not fatally
defective as to price if there is an agreement as
to some formula or method for fixing it. . ."
(emphasis added)
fid, at 859). The Court quoted from another case and said:
"In Burger v. City of Springfield, plaintiff
sued on a contract by which he was engaged to
negotiate the City's purchase of a water works for
a "reasonable compensation for services to be fixed
by the Council upon the completion of his
services." A Missouri statute forbade the city to
make any contract except for a consideration stated
in writing.
The court held the standard of
"reasonableness" was definite enough to permit
contract enforcement.
In that opinion, the Missouri court pointed
out that the law routinely enforces contracts which
expressly or impliedly provide for a reasonable
value to be placed on services. Where a trustee's
fee is not fixed by statute or the trust
instrument, the courts do not hesitate to fix a
reasonable compensation, and they violate no
precept against "making contracts" for parties in
so acting.
Courts frequently fix reasonable
attorney's fees where contracts or negotiable
instruments provide for them.
In Rankin v. Compton, the issue was whether a
contract was fatally indefinite because it provided
that a "reasonable charge" should be assessed for
certain financing services.
The court held the
parties to have fixed a sufficient standard so that
the court could, without fabricating a contract,
ascertain the price."
fid, at 859-860)
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POINT NO. 4
THE DECISION RENDERED WILL HAVE
AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON NUMEROUS
LEASE AGREEMENTS IN UTAH.
There are numerous lease agreements in existence in Utah
which have options to renew and which require the rental rate
during the new term to be increased to "reasonable rental",
"fair market rental value", or some other such similar term.
Those leases were executed by parties in reliance upon the
belief that such a provision (option to renew) was valid and
enforceable.

The opinion rendered in this case makes all

such clauses unenforceable.
POINT NO. 5
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE
COURT OVERRULES PREVIOUS CASE
LAW REGARDING
ITS
AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S
FEES
TO
THE
PLAINTIFF.

In the Findings of Fact, Paragraph 54, R 1212, the trial
court specifically found as follows:
"The Plaintiff, having terminated the lease,
is not entitled to any attorney's fees under or by
virtue of the lease agreement."
This finding of the trial court, was rendered after it
reviewed the written communications between the parties, and
after

it

received

testimony

which

demonstrated

that

the

Cottonwood Mall did not want the bowling lanes because it did
13

not create the right type of tenant mix.
In Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P. 2d 1102
(Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court established the rule that
when

a party

elects to terminate a lease agreement

and

proceed under the unlawful detainer statute it may not also
claim

the

contract.

right

to

attorneys

fees under

the

terminated

The Utah Supreme Court said:

"Concerning the award of attorneyfs fees, the
situation is different. There are two difficulties
with that award. The first is that the allegations
of the plaintiff fs complaint and the relief
demanded clearly indicate that the plaintiff had
cancelled and terminated the contract and based its
cause of action on our unlawful detainer statutes
Chapter 36, Title 78, U.C.A. 1953. Therefore it
was not then entitled to invoke the covenants of
the contract to obtain an attorney's fee. . ."
fid, at 1105.)
In Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P. 2d 294,
(1954), the Utah Supreme Court held that attorney's fees
would not be awarded to a party foreclosing (under the theory
of forfeiture), a vendee's rights under a Uniform Real Estate
Contract,

for the

reason that

the action became

one in

unlawful detainer and not to enforce the provisions of the
contract.
It

is

difficult

to

see

any

theoretical

difference

between the case at hand and Jacobson.
The holding in the case at hand appears to overrule not
14

only Lincoln, but also Jacboson and the entire body of case
law concerning the right to attorney's fees under Uniform
Real Estate Contract forclosures.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant seeks to have the Utah Supreme Court grant
Appellant's petition for rehearing to reconsider its decision
which concludes:
1.

That S. M. Horman's promise stated and restated to

"renew the lease upon reasonable terms" was not enforceable
in Utah; and,
2.

That

the

trial

court's

determination

that

no

attorney's fees be awarded was in error.
CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court,

counsel

for Appellant

hereby

certifies

that

this

Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for
delay.
Respectfully Submitted.
Dated this

day of December, 1988.

Jack L. Schoenhals
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Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for Appellant
Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc.
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